Philosophical Analysis

This volume announces a new era in the philosophy of God. Many of its contributions work to create stronger links between the philosophy of God, on the one hand, and mathematics or metamathematics, on the other hand. It is about not only the possibilities of applying mathematics or metamathematics to questions about God, but also the reverse question: Does the philosophy of God have anything to offer mathematics or metamathematics? The remaining contributions tackle stereotypes in the philosophy of religion.

The volume includes 35 contributions. It is divided into nine parts: 1. Who Created the Concept of God; 2. Omniscience, Omnipotence, Timelessness and Spacelessness of God; 3. God and Perfect Goodness, Perfect Beauty, Perfect Freedom; 4. God, Fundamentality and Creation of All Else; 5. Simplicity and Ineffability of God; 6. God, Necessity and Abstract Objects; 7. God, Infinity, and Pascal’s Wager; 8. God and (Meta-)Mathematics; and 9. God and Mind.

For fifty years the philosophy of language has been experiencing a stalemating conflict between the old descriptive and internalist orthodoxy (advocated by philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Strawson, and Searle) and the new causal-referential and externalist orthodoxy (mainly endorsed by Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan). Although the latter is dominant among specialists, the former retains a discomforting intuitive plausibility. The ultimate goal of this book is to overcome the stalemate by means of a non-naïve return to the old descriptivist-internalist orthodoxy. Concerning proper names, this means introducing second-order description-rules capable of systemizing descriptions of the proper name’s cluster to provide us with the right changeable conditions of satisfaction for its application. Such rules can explain how a proper name can become a rigid designator while remaining descriptive, disarming Kripke's and Donnellan’s main objections. In the last chapter, this new perspective is extended to indexicals in a discussion of David Kaplan’s and John Perry’s views, and of general terms, in a discussion of Hilary Putnam’s externalism.

Bewusstsein, Außenwelt und Sprache bilden eine untrennbare Einheit in der Frage nach dem Sinn und der Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke. Zeichen und ihre Verwendung lassen sich daher weder durch rein internalistische Bewusstseinsanalysen noch durch rein externalistische Gegenstandsbezüge angemessen rekonstruieren. Daher befinden sich Bedeutungen weder „innerhalb" noch „außerhalb" des Kopfes. Unterschiedliche Gebrauchsweisen und somit Bedeutungen spiegeln sich vielmehr in der Fähigkeit wieder, sprachliche Zeichen zu verstehen und auf unsere subjektiven Erlebnisse sowie die uns umgebende Welt anzuwenden.

Volker Munz zeigt, inwieweit sowohl rein phänomenale als auch rein physikalistische Interpretationsansätze zu kurz greifen, die Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke zu bestimmen. Beide Positionen stehen nicht in Widerstreit zueinander, sondern ergänzen einander vielmehr in der Bestimmung des Sinnes und der Bedeutung sprachlicher Zeichen. Sowohl externalistische Semantiken (Putnams Zwillingserde, Kripkes Marsianer, Davidsons Sumpfmann etc.) als auch internalistische Positionen (Locke, Thomas Nagel, Jackson etc.) werden anhand spezifischer Gedankenexperiment kritisch auf ihre Rolle und Schlüssigkeit hin überprüft und mit alternativen Gedankenszenarios konfrontiert. Neben den genannten Autoren werden auch Russell, Frege und insbesondere Wittgenstein ausführlich diskutiert.

This book develops and applies a novel kind of explanation: Empty-Base Explanation. While ordinary explanations have a tripartite structure involving an explanandum, a base of reasons why the explanandum obtains, and a link that connects the reasons to the explanandum, this book argues that there are explanations whose corresponding set of reasons is empty. This novel idea is located in the theoretical background of several fundamental philosophical issues. For example, it provides a convincing kind of ultimate or final explanation that completely and conclusively explains a phenomenon without involving other phenomena for which further explanations could be demanded.

The possibility and fruitfulness of empty-base explanation is defended by general considerations from the theory of explanation, as well as concrete applications to

• the practice of explanation by status,
• the explanation of logical theorems, causal connections, and laws of nature,
• self-explanation,
• the use of IBE in metaphysics,
• the notion of zero-ground (which it provides with a solid theoretical footing), and
• ultimate explanation and its application to philosophical cosmology, the debate about the PSR, and the question of why there is anything at all.

For this book, Yannic Kappes has received the 2022 De Gruyter Prize for Ontology and Metaphysics from the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP).

Metaphern sind in unserer Kommunikation weit verbreitete Phänomene, die bei genauerer Betrachtung einige Fragen aufwerfen. Es muss z.B. erklärt werden, wie es möglich ist, metaphorische Deutungen zu erschließen, wo diese doch teilweise drastisch von den wörtlichen Bedeutungen der jeweiligen Ausdrücke abweichen. Ebenfalls erläuterungsbedürftig ist u.a., inwieweit Metaphern einer wörtlichen Paraphrase zugänglich sind und in welchem Maße sie in die semantisch-syntaktische Struktur von Sprache eingebunden sind. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden nicht nur zahlreiche zu diesem Thema erschienene sprachphilosophische, linguistische und psychologische Studien vorgestellt. Jacob Hesse entwickelt auch einen eigenständigen Ansatz, mit dem Einseitigkeiten und Reduktionismen vermieden werden, die in vielen gängigen Metapherntheorien vorhanden sind. Dies erreicht der Autor u.a. dadurch, dass er die linguistischen Eigenschaften von metaphorisch verstandenen Ausdrücken von der Struktur der mit ihnen verbundenen Interpretationsprozesse differenziert. Mit seinem Ansatz werden auch aufschlussreiche Beiträge für das Verständnis von weiteren Stilmitteln wie Metonymie und Ironie, sowie dem Wechselverhältnis zwischen Semantik und Pragmatik geliefert.

Weingartner shows that an essential part of natural or philosophical theology and even a part of theology can be treated axiomatically. God’s essence, omniscience, omnipotence, creating activity, and all-goodness are described by axioms and by theorems proved from them.

Almost everyone can run. Only very few can run a marathon. But what is it for agents to be able to do things? This question, while central to many debates in philosophy, is still awaiting a comprehensive answer. The book provides just that. Drawing on some valuable insights from previous works of abilities and making use of possible world semantics, Jaster develops the "success view", a view on which abilities are a matter of successful behavior. Along the way, she explores the gradable nature of abilities, the contextsensitivity of ability statements, the difference between general and specific abilities, the relationship between abilities and dispositions, and the ability to act otherwise. The book is mandatory reading for anyone working on abilities, and provides valuable insights for anyone dealing with agents' abilities in other fields of philosophy.

For this book, Romy Jaster has received both the Wolfgang Stegmüller Prize and the De Gruyter Prize for Analytical Philosophy of Mind or Metaphysics/Ontology.

This book is a collection of articles authored by renowed Polish ontologists living and working in the early part of the 21st century. Harking back to the well-known Polish Lvov-Warsaw School, founded by Kazimierz Twardowski, we try to make our ontological considerations as systematically rigorous and clear as possible – i.e. to the greatest extent feasible, but also no more than the subject under consideration itself allows for. Hence, the papers presented here do not seek to steer clear of methods of inquiry typical of either the formal or the natural sciences: on the contrary, they use such methods wherever possible. At the same time, despite their adherence to rigorous methods, the Polish ontologists included here do not avoid traditional ontological issues, being inspired as they most certainly are by the great masters of Western philosophy – from Plato and Aristotle, through St. Thomas and Leibniz, to Husserl, to name arguably just the most important.

The old philosophical discipline of metaphysics – after having been pronounced dead by many – has enjoyed a significant revival within the last thirty years, due to the application of the methods of analytic philosophy. One of the major contributors to this revival is the outstanding American metaphysician Peter van Inwagen. This volume brings together twenty-two scholars, who, in commemoration of Prof. van Inwagen's 75th birthday, ponder the future prospects of metaphysics in all the richness to which it has now returned. It is only natural that logical and epistemological reflections on the significance of metaphysics – sometimes called “meta-metaphysics” – play a considerable role in most of these papers. The volume is further enriched by an interview with Peter van Inwagen himself.

Der ontologische Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit ist eines der zentralen Probleme sowohl der klassischen als auch der modernen Metaphysik. In der analytischen Philosophie wird dieses Problem zumeist als Frage der Interpretation von möglichen Welten aufgefasst: ein Konzept, das (unter anderem) auf den amerikanischen Logiker und Sprachphilosophen Saul Kripke zurückgeht. Zur Interpretation dieses Konzepts leistet das vorliegende Buch einen entscheidenen Beitrag, in dem es aus Kripkes vage Andeutungen eine deflationäre Metaphysik möglicher Welten entwickelt und in den Zusammenhang von sprachphilosophischer Referenztheorie, formaler Logik und metaphysischem Essentialismus einbettet. Dabei leistet Sebastian Krebs nicht nur die erste deutschsprachige Einführung in Kripkes Metaphysik, sondern bietet eine ausführliche Auseinandersetzung mit David Lewis’ modalem Realismus und anderen wichtigen Positionen der analytischen Metaphysik. Sein modalmetaphysischer Deflationismus klärt schließlich nicht nur das Konzept der möglichen Welten, sondern entwirrt die metaphysisch "aufgeblasene" Debatte um den ontologischen Status von Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit durch eine konsequente Rückbindung an den gesunden Menschenverstand.

The book provides philosophical interpretations of pragmatic issues. It concentrates on well-established concepts such as presupposition, entailment, implicature, speech acts, subsentential speech acts, different cases of meaning as use, expressive meanings and expressive commitments, as well as the relation between knowledge and belief. The discussion goes beyond linguistic investigations and offers a wide philosophical perspective.

The book begins with an extensive survey of the history of logic diagrams, including looking at possible diagrams from Aristotle, the development of both linear and closed figure diagrams by Leibniz, Lambert, Euler, Venn’s new system, Peirce’s Existential Graphs, and Frege’s two-dimensional notation as a kind of logic diagram system. During most of the 20^th century, there was little regard for efforts to construct logic diagrams. However, since the 1980s there has been an increasing interest in such diagrams. Ever larger numbers of philosophers, logicians, mathematicians, computational scientists, and cognitive scientists have turned their attention to building, analyzing, using, or exploring in other ways systems of logic diagrams. The system offered here makes use of line segments and points and it enjoys a number of important advantages: it is simple, natural, and both expressively and inferentially powerful. It can be used to analyze syllogisms (including those involving relational terms) and arguments involving unanalyzed statements. Understanding such a system can shed valuable light on how ordinary people naturally reason.